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Agency and Sovereignty: Georges Bataille’s
Anti-Humanist Conception of Child
SHARON HUNTER
Georges Bataille (1887–1962) is one of the most significant
thinkers of the 20th century, whose anti-humanist
anthropology influenced subsequent existentialist and
post-structuralist philosophy. His wide-ranging writings
(across philosophy, archaeology, economics, sociology, poetry,
erotica and history of art) frequently mention children,
childhood and childishness, and yet there has hitherto been
little to no attention paid to this aspect of his work. This article
opens up a neglected theme in Bataille studies, and also
explores the consequences of Bataille’s presentation of the
human condition for our understanding of the pedagogical
relationship. Of particular interest is the idea of the agentic
child, which occupies such an important place in childhood
studies, educational theory and public policy. In the light of
Bataille’s anthropology, I shall explore the idea that the
pursuit of children’s agency is the victim of its vaunting
ambition.
INTRODUCTION
There is dismay amongst many educators about the deadening effects
of regimes of measurement and narrowing educational objectives in our
school systems. It seems that whilst the academic community talks about
children’s agency, participation and ‘voice’, meanwhile contemporary
education progressively diverges from these concerns with pedagogical
approaches that are authoritarian, disciplinarian and transmissive. This di-
vergence is likely to continue since policy is moved by many different so-
cial and political currents and eddies that have their origins in general,
obdurate and often global trends. But rather than conceive of this diver-
gence as a simple clash of educational values along the lines of a pro-
gressive/traditional binary, I want to consider the possibility that there is
a fundamental misstep in the way we have come to think of children’s
agency, and that this mistake has contributed to the difficulties now be-
ing experienced. The second part of this paper will venture the introduction
of Georges Bataille, an unfamiliar voice in childhood studies, to explore
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alternative conceptions of agency, or something akin to it, through explo-
ration of the concepts of taboo, transgression and sovereignty.
The Agentic Child
The agentic child is the pivot on which contemporary childhood studies
turns: the importance afforded to voice and agency could hardly be over-
stated. Pedagogical theory, research methodologies and public policy take
children’s agency as precept, yet the idea of agency has only a jagged and
constrained relation to the two dominant, incommensurate but interweaving
paradigms. Firstly, the child as ‘being’, realising its potential and bearing
inalienable rights; that is, the humanist child with the moral and legal claims
of personhood premised upon their essential nature as anthropos. Secondly,
the socially constructed, culturally constituted child: situated, plastic and
acted upon. Both models, in different ways, are the vehicles for emancipa-
tory thinking: the recognition of children as rights-bearing members of the
human species is the legal basis for protection, provision and for their par-
ticipation in ‘all matters affecting the child’; while a social constructivist
paradigm alerts us to the contingency of children’s lives and, to an extent,
provides a foundation for interventions seeking social change. Indeed, the
original interest in children’s agency was, as Oswell observes, ‘less an ex-
ercise in theory than in politics’ (Oswell, 2012, p. 38).
Neither paradigm – the humanist nor the constructivist – lends itself
to anything more than a disappointing version of agency. In the human-
ist paradigm the child’s agency is circumscribed by the parameters of her
nature and potential where, in its biological form, the child develops psy-
chologically and physically to a predetermined biological mandate. In the
constructivist paradigm the child is formed by determinant structural fea-
tures of their situation. None of the principal theories of the mutual con-
stitution of agency and structure address the particular situation of being
a child. When Margaret Archer, for example, speaks of ‘our human abil-
ity to intervene in the world of nature and change it’ (Archer, 1995, p. 1),
the first person pronoun does not obviously include children, nor are they
specifically mentioned in her writing. In fact, the raison d’etre of a great
deal of childhood studies scholarship is to make spaces and foster skills
so that children might exert such influence, precisely because this does not
happen as a matter of course in human society. Notwithstanding these con-
ceptual difficulties, the agentic child reigns and sways research, policy and
pedagogy.
This seminal lack of theoretical scrutiny leaves a legacy of contradic-
tory postulates: the primacy of the individual or the social, the position on
nature versus nurture and, most fundamentally, the essentialist/modernist
or constructionist/postmodern versions of the world. In childhood studies
these two distinct paradigms appear sometimes to merge as though one
somehow leads to the other. This is quite puzzling. In what looks like a
case of having your conceptual cake and eating it, we are told that there
is no universal child and also, what that child is. The socially constructed
child could equally be passive – what would prevent it? Only appeal to
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a universal or transcendental vision, which cuts the feet from the original
revelation of the child as socially constructed. Following the comments of
Alanen (2017), the ontological grounding of childhood studies has not hith-
erto been a focus of attention. This situation is rapidly changing, however,
as I will outline shortly.
In educational discourse we find the same ‘vexatious’ tension. Gert Bi-
esta contrasts socialisation with individuation, and equates the latter with
what he calls ‘subjectification’, which he describes as ‘the opposite of the
socialization function [of education]’ (2010, p. 21). He refers to a long tra-
dition of educational philosophy that held this process of subjectification
to be the defining function of education: ‘to become more autonomous and
independent in … thinking and acting’ (ibid.). The notion of subjectivity at
work here is so familiar that it is almost undetectable: to be a subject is to
think and to act on one’s own. In reality people think and act in relation-
ship or engagement with others, and the social and material continuity or
contiguity of our agency belies any satisfying notion of the ‘independent
mind’.
Ryan observed in 2011 that a ‘new wave’ of childhood studies had started
to emerge, which draws on the work of post-war continental philosophers
such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Bruno Latour, Georges Bataille,
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. What this emergent scholarship shares,
according to Ryan, is a desire to bypass binaries, and instead employ no-
tions of ‘hybridity’ and ‘multiplicity’ (Ryan, 2011). I think that the desire
has a more radical orientation as new scholarship in childhood studies is
starting to engage with contemporary challenges to the primacy of individ-
ual human subjectivity and agency. An attachment to the idea of human
agency and dominion substantiates the agentic child; dominionist preju-
dice and the individualist ontology that it generates are the targets of ‘new
wave’ endeavour. This is a direct challenge to Enlightenment humanism’s
nationalism (Braidotti, 2013, p. 16), colonialism (Fanon, 1963) and its cre-
ation of the racialised, gendered and naturalised other as a ‘justification for
pillage’ (Sartre, 1963, p. 21). The wider ethical import of our conception
of the agentic child can no longer be ignored: it is offspring of the mod-
ern human, and so is implicated in the impending global ecological crisis,
about which the field of childhood studies is remarkably silent. Recent work
has started to recognise underlying political and epistemological ideolo-
gies: Cook (2018, p. 135) observes that the ’darling’ of childhood studies
… bears marked similarity to the idealised subject of neoliberalism, whilst
others have noted the cultural specificity of the dominant interpretations of
children’s agency, calling for ‘greater dialogue across majority and minority
worlds’ (Punch, 2016, p. 193) or for the acknowledgement of the normative
assumptions that are applied to the attribution of children’s agency (Kayser,
2016).
As the substantivist ontologies of humanism and constructivism increas-
ingly give way to more nuanced and complex understandings, there has
been growing interest in relational approaches to understanding the na-
ture of children’s agency. Alanen (2000, 2001) describes how recognition
of childhood as an ‘essentially generational phenomenon’ can lead to an
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understanding of the way in which relational social structures help us to
develop a perspective on the agentic nature of childhood. This perspec-
tive focusses on the internal relationships of the social world and high-
lights the interdependency of both adulthood and childhood. Alanen’s over-
arching concern is to develop an account that upholds the ‘basic premiss
(sic)’ of new childhood studies, that is ‘securing children’s agency’ (2001,
pp. 17, 21). This leads to assertions of the reciprocal nature of the adult–
child relationship in which both relata are ‘constructed’ in the situation,
albeit asymmetrically (ibid., p. 19). What strikes me about this conceptual-
isation of childhood is the apparent absence of any awareness that adults in
fact, in reality, generate children: the idea of begetting, or making, even,
does not figure in the generational relationship – despite this sense be-
ing a conspicuous aspect of the word’s meaning. The material genesis of
the adult–child relationship (e.g. gestation, birth-giving, breast feeding)
seems to be of no interest, and not substantive for its conceptualisation.
In other words, matter does not matter, and motherhood is dissolved into
the more generic state of adulthood. This elision facilitates an account of
co-construction that supports the axiological assertion of children’s agency.
The generational conceptualisation precedes the ‘ontological turn’ in
childhood studies. In particular, there is growing interest in ‘relational on-
tology’, a notion that has passed through an extraordinarily diverse array
of academic disciplines, including theology, psychology and information
science, before being left on the doorstep of childhood studies. This mis-
chievous notion upturns the Aristotelian ontological priority of substance,
the relata, over relation making, in this case, both children and adults
conceptually subordinate to the relation between them. Neither human-
centredness nor child-centredness is without significant dangers (Jessop,
2018), so this relational move opens up a space to consider alternative
orientations in our thinking about ourselves and the world. It also rein-
states matter (human and non-human bodies) as worthy of consideration
for understanding agency. Although at the forefront of contemporary phi-
losophy, the antecedents of this ontological turn lie in the philosophical
anti-humanism of the last century.
Anti-humanism is a capacious concept originally associated with Marx-
ism (Althusser, 2010) but also with Fascism and the evangelical extreme
right in the United States (Elisha, 2008). It is used as a term of op-
probrium in relation to post-structuralism (Hollis and Lukes, 1997) and
approvingly in the context of philosophical animism (Plumwood, 1993),
post-Newtonian cosmology and ‘deep ecology’ (Mathews, 1991), the re-
positioning of the human in post-humanism (Braidotti, 2013), radical cri-
tiques of colonialism (Fanon, 1963), as well as in the turn towards east-
ern philosophies and religions, nature-based spiritualities such as Wicca
and aboriginal belief systems, all of which in some way de-centre human
subjectivity. From the end of the First World War to the late 1950s anti-
humanism came to be one of the dominant faces of philosophy, though
in a strange inversion of this philosophical aspect, the end of the Second
World War heralded the beginning of the human rights era.1 At no time
before has awareness of human hubris been more intense than in Europe
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in the first half of the 20th century. The technologically enabled catastro-
phes of the first half of the 20th century left belief in progress tattered and
shamed. It is this period that Geroulanos (2010, p. 1) describes as ‘a philo-
sophical and intellectual revolution … [that] created a new kind of atheism,
demolished the value of humanism, and altered the meaning of “the hu-
man” virtually beyond recognition’. Thus, anti-humanism cleared the path
for subsequent postmodern and post-humanist thought. Here I introduce
a pre-eminent anti-humanist thinker closely associated with the Surrealist
movement,2 whose philosophical anthropology is original, provocative and
enables a reassessment of the notion of agency, particularly in respect of
children.
GEORGES BATAILLE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTI-HUMANISM
George Bataille (1887–1962) mentions the child, childhood and childish-
ness sporadically throughout his writings: she is pitied and admired, true
and false, free and utterly constrained. Notions of ‘childishness’ and ‘child-
like’ occupy a central place in his explorations of human experience. The
Surrealist heirs to the Romantic critique were close intellectual and per-
sonal associates of Bataille, bringing him into the orbit of new conceptions
of childhood, influenced by the Occult, by Freud and Jung and by philo-
sophical anti-capitalism.3 Despite all this, to date, there have been no stud-
ies focussing on Bataille’s child, and only passing mention of the child in
the context of other Bataille scholarship. The steady post-humous develop-
ment of Bataille’s reputation has entered a new wave since the mid-1990s,
with a number of new translations, collections and commentaries. The in-
tention of this paper is to open up a neglected theme in Bataille’s work, and
also to explore the consequences of Bataille’s presentation of the human
condition for our understanding of the child both as icon and lived reality.
Bataille’s Child
The child in Bataille’s thought is not human: rather his anthropology situ-
ates the child as animal-becoming-human. He proposes the notion of child-
ishness as an adult construct propaedeutic to the state of reason: it denotes
a relational state of becoming. Grown-ups induct newcomers into the char-
acteristically human system and over time children become human. It is
axiomatic in several disciplines that make up childhood studies that chil-
dren are persons. This is the foundation of the normative standard for the
treatment of children: legal personhood is the determining condition for a
standard of legal protection not granted to other beings. There is also the
biological fact of human DNA indicating species membership. Neither of
these conceptions either contradict or confirm the notion of child implicit
in Bataille’s understanding of the human condition. What is at issue is the
adult–child relationship and this is fundamentally pedagogical.
The calm ordering of life is brought to an end with the arrival of a baby:
blood and shit and vomit and screaming are an unavoidable daily experi-
ence. (Reading about children in childhood literature, one sometimes can-
not help wondering if the authors have ever met one.) When we are in a
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parenting relationship with a child we first deal with aspects of their be-
haviour that must be curtailed in order to live a human life. The pedagogical
relationship starts in this place. So I take nappies as my starting point:
Intestinal dejecta
Menstrual blood seems to have condensed the abhorrence and the fear.
The behaviors relative to the other excretions are striking, but there
are no prohibitions dealing with them like those aimed at preserving
humanity from the least contamination by blood.
[He then goes on to suggest that the reason there are less elaborate
purity rules about ‘intestinal evacuation’ is mainly because men do it
too.]
[C]hildren, with whom our contracts are unavoidable, would destroy
a priori the hope of eliminating the contamination entirely. Nothing
can be demanded of a young child, whereas a pubescent girl regularly
observes the prescriptions. It was necessary to get used to bearing
with this infantile waste, which explains the mildness of the disgust
it provokes: nothing more extreme than the reaction to animal waste.
Besides, what are children if not animals becoming human – but this
is not on their own initiative … (Bataille, 1991, p. 65)
What pedagogical initiative do adults take?
[W]e teach our children to be ashamed of filth … the mother sim-
ply says to the child: ‘It’s dirty,’ and she often even uses the childish
word denoting both excrement and the forbidding of contact. (Bataille,
1991, p. 72)
In a later work he returns to this idea:
We do not take long to forget what trouble we go to to pass on to
our children the aversions that make us what we are, which make us
human beings to begin with. Our children do not spontaneously have
our reactions …. We have to teach them by pantomime or failing that,
by violence, that curious aberration called disgust … passed onto us
from the earliest men through countless generations of scolded chil-
dren. (Bataille, 2012a, p. 58)
This first initiative of adults in relation to the child is one of bifurcation:
what can be admitted into human life and what must be excluded. To make
sense of this we need first to pay attention to Bataille’s understanding of the
human.
Being Human
In contrast to social and cultural anthropology, the sense in which I use
the word here is philosophical rather than comparative. There is no neces-
sary assumption that there is a plurality of ways of being human. Rather,
the presumption is that it is possible to make meaningful statements about
the human condition per se. The question is, what is it to be human? In a
nutshell, for Bataille, to be human is to enter into the human economy of
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production. Human existence happens in the space formed by two modes
of action: taboo and transgression.
The advent of taboo is what marks the genesis of human society. It is the
stretching out and separation of what is human and what is not. What makes
the formation of the human collective possible is the exclusion of ‘vio-
lence’, and this is achieved by the institution of taboos. Sigmund Freud’s
writings on taboo were well known and highly influential at the beginning
of the last century. Like Bataille, Freud associated taboos with desire. He
also saw them as ancient, describing them in racialised language as ‘the
dark origin of our own categorical imperative’ (Freud, 2001a).4 But as that
last quotation indicates, he distances modern European humans from the
idea of taboo, seeing it as vestigial with no continuing function and appear-
ing only in the form of compulsive disorders and neuroses. For proponents
of homo rationalis that which is non-rational is less than human.
This is reversed by Bataille. Taboo is itself non-rational, but it makes rea-
son possible. Reason needs a certain kind of space, free from violent desire
and its expression. The means by which it does this is not through reason
but emotional states such as fear, terror, disgust and shame, the prospect of
anguish: ‘basically a shudder appealing not to reason but to feeling, just as
violence is’ (Bataille, 2012a, p. 6). Though we only become conscious of
this relationship and feel this way when violation of taboo is a possibility
before us. This ‘calm ordering’ (ibid., p. 38) makes possible human soci-
ety: the human collective. Thus violence, which is defined by its opposition
to reason (ibid., p. 55) because it is the result of emotional states (ibid.,
p. 64), is in a sense both the beginning and the substance of human society.
Contrary to the belief that ‘taboo prohibitions lack all justification and are
of unknown origin’ (Freud, 2001a, p. 18), taboo for Bataille is the living
foundation of all human societies.5
The mode of the human collective is ‘work’ and it is work that results
in production, which enables us to meet our physical needs and, crucially,
to meet the needs of our dependent children: ‘Taboos are there to make
work possible; work is productive’ (Bataille, 2012a, p. 68). Work entails de-
ferred or functional expenditure and allows us to plan and think beyond the
present. At the centre of Bataille’s thought is the idea of the social: living to-
gether in a complex future-orientated social nexus and communicating with
one another are core distinguishing features of the human animal. Commu-
nication means ‘all forms by which the individual moves out of a state of
enclosure in its own isolated existence and opens on to others’ (Hewson
and Coelen, 2016, p. 13). The idea of ‘project’ is closely connected to that
of work: this is the term Bataille prefers to progress. Work literally projects
into the future creating what he calls a ‘paradoxical way of being in time:
it is putting existence off until later’ (Bataille, 2014, p. 51). He declares his
‘opposition to the idea of project’ and, more playfully, his ‘project of escap-
ing from project’, for emersion in project is slavish and degrading (ibid.,
pp. 64, 49).
Transgression is the crossing of a line drawn by taboo. ‘Organised trans-
gression’ complements taboo. In earlier human societies there were desig-
nated times for transgressive behaviour: rituals, festivals, the death of kings.
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These were occasions of non-productive consumption, of expenditure and
excess. This weft in the fabric of society changed as ‘the great free forms
of unproductive social expenditure’ fell out of use as capitalism replaced
feudalism (Bataille, 1985, p. 124). Transgression took the individual form
of the erotic, until even this was subdued by project. In its place is the hyp-
ocritical ‘hatred of expenditure’ of the bourgeoisie (ibid., pp. 124–125).
The venal behaviour and insatiable appetite of this class makes it the target
of Bataille’s most vehement criticism – he does not miss and hits the wall
when he spits:
It is right to recognise that the people are incapable of hating them
as much as their former masters, to the extent that they are capa-
ble of loving them, for the bourgeois are incapable of concealing a
sordid face, a face so rapacious and lacking in nobility, so frighten-
ingly small, that all human life, upon seeing it, seems degraded. (ibid.,
p. 125)
In a reversal of the common order, it is not prohibition that Bataille iden-
tifies with the sacred, but transgression. The sacred is present in what is ex-
pelled from homogenous society: from the body (blood, sweat, tears, shit),
in extreme emotions (anger, laughter, drunkenness) and in non-utilitarian
social activity (games, poetry, eroticism) (Richardson, 1994, p. 36). It is in
this ‘dejecta’ that humans are sovereign – free from the instrumental and
utilitarian thinking that is required of project.
In this way Bataille entirely subverts the familiar notion of sovereignty.
Whereas for Kant it refers to the primacy of individual reason, and for Niet-
zsche it means the free spirits, the ‘commanders and law givers’ (Nietzsche
and Del Caro, 2014, ch. 6, para 211), Bataille opposes it to the domain
of work and project – means-end orientated discursive thinking. Instead it
is ‘pure expenditure’ – ‘generous, orgiastic and excessive’ (Bataille, 1985,
p. 124). The kind of autonomy we ordinarily mean is a kind of algoryth-
mic freedom – liberty to determine and pursue ends without constraint or
duress. Sovereignty is liberty from ends and from the heteronomy or auton-
omy that determine means.
A slack reading of Bataille could miss the radical reversals in his account
of being human. The role of taboo is not that of conquest over emotion;
reason does not have dominion over violence. Rather reason is dependent
on strong emotion for its very existence. The images that Bataille uses to
describe this relationship are not oppositional, as one has come to expect
in the more familiar Christian binary of good and evil, light and darkness.
Nor is it a question of challenge to taboo, the notion of subversion, since the
transgression reinforces and confirms taboo: transgression ‘does not deny
the taboo, but transcends it and completes it’ (Bataille, 2012a, p. 63). Rather
Bataille employs symbiotic metaphors such as dance: ‘The dance of human
life would now come closer to violence, now distance itself from it in terror,
as if its attitudes were composed in view of a compromise with violence it-
self ’ (ibid., p. 3). Elsewhere he describes the movement between the taboo
and the desire to transgress it as a heartbeat: ‘just as the diastolic movement
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completes the systolic one … The compression is not subservient to the ex-
plosion, far from it; it gives it increased force’ (ibid., p. 65). This symbiotic
relationship gives us the first layer of understanding heterology. This is the
profound and dynamic duality of human existence:
There are therefore, broadly speaking, two opposed regions in hu-
man affairs, one homogeneous, profane and commonly practiced, the
other heterogeneous, completely other, deeply separated from the first
and, additionally, itself deeply divided by the violent opposition be-
tween pure and impure, angelic and obscene, noble and common …
(Bataille, 2018b, p. 36)
At the beginning of The Accursed Share Bataille describes a man who
bounces his child on his knee at home but in war burns, kills and tortures.
(Written in the immediate aftermath of WW2, one thinks about the death
camp commanders who enjoyed domestic normalcy with their families just
outside the camps where they committed their atrocities.) Through such
apparently exceptional examples of belonging to two worlds, Bataille pro-
poses this as the essential human condition, a universal anti-syzygy: ‘Man
belongs in any case to both of these worlds [taboo and transgression] and
between them willy-nilly his life is torn’ (Bataille, 2012a, p. 40). Taboo me-
diates this self-estrangement that defines the human: taboo is the relational
term that constitutes the human self.
What is portioned off as inhuman is what Bataille calls ‘the accursed
share’. We deny our own heterogeneity, our forked nature (I am this; I am
also this) in order to ‘keep [our] place in the mechanical order’ (Bataille,
1991, p. 24). But humanity is not homogeneous: ‘We often speak of the
world, of humanity, as if it had some unity. In reality, humanity forms
worlds, seemingly related but actually alien to one another … [T]his in-
compatibility also concentrates in a single individual’ (ibid., p. 21). ‘Con-
ceivable humanity’ is that thinking, planning, rational way of being. We
achieve this delusion of unity by refusing the integration or assimilation of
what Bataille calls the ‘erotic’.
Adult–Child Pedagogical Relationship
In Bataille’s thought there is nothing inevitable about the eventual humanity
of the child. They do not become human of their own volition, or due to any
biological process of maturation. Bataille’s understanding of the child as
‘animal-becoming-human’ involves the intentional activity of adults upon
the child in order to take them to the state of being we call human. This is
how the adult–child relationship is described in Inner Experience:
The miniscule ‘absents’ are not in contact with the world, if not
through the channel of grown-ups: the result of the intervention of
grown-ups is childishness, a fabrication. Grown-ups obviously reduce
the being that comes into the world, which we are at first, to trinkets.
This seems important to me: that the passage from the state of nature
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(of birth) to our state of reason necessarily takes place along the path
of childishness.
Childishness is the state wherein we put the naïve being, from the fact
that we must lead it there, even without precisely willing it, we lead
it to the point where we are. When we laugh at childish absurdity, the
laugh disguises the shame that we feel, seeing to what we reduce life
emerging from nothingness. (Bataille, 2014a, p. 47)
The intention to change someone’s relation to the world is fundamentally
pedagogical. The child is not ‘in contact with the world’, that is, with the
world as object of its attention. The adult ‘fabricates’ the artificial construct
of childishness, in which state the child is first reduced and uprooted from
now, and then brought to the place where we are, the world of existence de-
ferred, of utility and of continence. The end of the pedagogical relationship
is the recapitulation of the primeval heterogeneity of the human condition.
What this means is that a child cannot transgress. If the child is on the
pathway of childishness then by definition they are not yet properly subject
to taboo. There are things that they are not permitted to do, but they do
not yet experience anguish at the thought of transgression. The child is not
yet fully ‘uprooted from nature’ so their impulses do not yet have meaning
in the human world and childhood is not ‘an active expression of human
being’ (Jenks, 1996, p. 150). Nonetheless, they are never members of any
other animal species. Conversely an animal is never childish: their existence
is chrysalid, liminal between animal and human.
The implications of Bataille’s notion of childishness should be a barrier
to the instrumentalisation of children’s behaviour, that is, as a challenge
or critique of the current order. And this is important: transgression can
never be part of a project. The appropriation of transgression to an end is a
recurring misstep in Bataille scholarship. The origins of this may be traced
in part to the interpretation of Bataille presented by Foucault in his essay
‘Preface to Transgression’[4]. Here he acknowledges the co-dependence of
taboo and transgression:
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever den-
sity of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely
uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it
merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows. (Foucault,
1977, p. 34)
And yet his account does just this: the ‘limits’ – he does not use the
term ‘taboo’ except once, preferring ‘la limite’ – are pale and insubstantial,
without purpose or definition. A limit is always genitive, always a limit of
something else. Foucault’s overriding interest is in the nature of transgres-
sion rather than in taboo, that human-defining digression from the animal.
Regardless of his acknowledgement of the reciprocity and co-dependency
of the two concepts he manages to succeed in separating transgression from
the whole. This permits precisely the oppositional positioning of trans-
gression that appears in many contemporary Bataille studies.5 Given the
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definitional centrality of taboo to the human and to the human collective,
and the central importance of the child in relation to taboo in Bataille’s
anthropology, this Foucauldian reconfiguration changes substantially what
can be said about the pedagogical relationship.
CONSEQUENCES6
I began with a complaint around the state of children’s agency, and how, de-
spite the centrality of these ideas in education, public policy and academic
research, progress towards realising them in practice is somewhat disap-
pointing, particularly in the context of vaunting ambitions for children to
be empowered, included, liberated: for them to reach their ‘full potential’.
Children’s agency is often tokenistic, sometimes disingenuous and, more
than occasionally, uninteresting to adults or to the children themselves. The
spaces for children’s agency are strictly circumscribed by practical consid-
erations concerning their levels of understanding, need for protection and
adults’ desire (however it is motivated) to direct and control. In thinking
about the ontologies of the child employed in childhood studies I observed
that not only are the two principal ontologies – the humanist and the con-
structivist – incompatible, but also that neither actually allows for anything
other than a thin conception of agency.
Reading Bataille leads me to think that rather than focusing on ‘fixing’
children’s agency, we probably need to manage our expectations by found-
ing them on a clearer understanding of what we are about, what can and
what cannot be achieved in the pedagogical relationship. It may be that our
treatment of children, whether we are paid or unpaid educators, is misdi-
rected if we pay too little attention to the task of introducing children to
the system of taboo that defines the human collective, in that we reduce the
chances of the children participating in discursive reasoning at some point
along the path. On first impression, this seems to be an inherently conserva-
tive educational position: education as the creation of ‘docile bodies’. But
docility is not a requirement for taboo – quite the opposite. Docility is about
the eradication of desire, strong emotion, violence. This kind of education
is narcotic. The pedagogical relation that is implicit in Bataille’s ‘path of
childishness’ is, in contrast, highly emotionally charged. Induction relies
on shame, violence, mockery and, in time, the experience of anguish when
the transgression of taboo is contemplated.
If we were previously imagining that pedagogy is an intention in relation
to reason, then Bataille pushes our attention back to a primary intention
to ‘make space’ for reason through the harnessing of un-reason (shame,
fear) in order to control and hold back what is not admissible in the space
of reason (extreme emotion, desire, bodily excreta, useless activity). The
space created by taboo is not sovereign space. Rather it is a space of solid-
ity: of work directed to goals, with utility as the only measure of value, of
traditional disciplinary scholarship, of quantifiable inert existence. Though
work is not servility, nonetheless it is an a priori impossibility to foster
sovereignty as the outcome of end-orientated pedagogical activity. The au-
tonomy we seek to foster is an algorithmic freedom – liberty to define
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problems, determine ends and pursue means. This understanding is more
modest, but it might save progressive educators from turning the Crank –
a machine of pointless labour pursued to the point of exhaustion – in an
endeavour to achieve something apparently greater.
But this does not mean that change – transformation if you prefer – is
impossible. Docility favours the status quo, but not so taboo. Because taboo
is constituted by the very things it seeks to limit, it means that there is an
explosive tension in being human. Belief in growth and evolution is part
of project as it describes linear progress; it is not a complete description
of human life. Change, for Bataille, is more like a chemical explosion, a
build-up of internal tension, the continuity of the erotic around the world of
work and project.
Why do we even need to think about this? Bataille struggles to speak
about the state we are in. To do so is to be entangled in a contradiction:
discursive reason is the mode of project not of sovereignty. The task of
talking about sovereignty is heavy and resistant, and takes on the shape of
project as soon as discursive reason is applied. Bataille playfully describes
this impossibility as the ‘project of escaping from project’, and the repeated
acknowledgement of this contradiction in his writings somewhat lessens my
own hesitancy about instrumentalising his thought (Bataille, 2014a, p. 64).
The need to pursue this comes out of a sense of crisis or endgame in the
human collective. In the 1930s and 1940s the reason for this is obvious. In
our own time, the sense is more acute as the very real prospect of ecological
collapse and species extinction desiccates human project.
Bataille’s diagnosis is unexpected. Under conditions of late modernity we
are experiencing the fruition of denial of eroticism – ‘an attempt to deny
and close out death and our connection with nature’ (Richardson, 1994).
The absence of transgression in modernity results in homogeneity, in direct
denial of the bivalency of human nature. This is an absolute and irrevocable
loss of sovereignty:
The mind of man has become its own slave and, through the labor of
autodigestion that the operation assumes, has consumed, subjugated,
destroyed itself. Cog within the available cogs, the mind of man makes
of itself abuse whose effects escape him – to the extent that this effect
is only the end, nothing subsists in the mind of man that is not a useful
thing. (Bataille, 2014a, p. 134)
What we are experiencing is not the result of the Enlightenment, though
this is an important acceleration of a trend in human history. The current
state we are in had its genesis in the notion that the relation between taboo
and transgression was adversarial. This is the Christian belief in good and
evil and, ultimately, of salvation: ‘salvation is the summit of every possible
project and peak in matters of project’ (Bataille, 2014a, p. 52). There can
only be one victor in the battle between sin and salvation and this under-
standing constitutes the germ of homogeneity.
The path of childishness enrols the child in the human project and en-
tails ‘putting existence off until later’. Under conditions of homogeneity,
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we require that the child, like ourselves, put existence off forever. Moder-
nity’s futurism is utterly self-defeating: instead of ensuring future sur-
vival, it makes it an impossibility. The total suppression of heterology is
dangerous:
Bataille’s whole thinking assumes that the enormity of what happened
in the concentration camps was not an aberration of mankind, rather
it showed the danger we run if we engage in a collective repression of
our fundamental internal violence. (Richardson, 1994, p. 131)
Rescuing the pedagogical project needs to start with self-examination
about where we are leading children if we are taking them to where we
are, and where we are heading as a species. The adult shame is not to do
with our fundamental relation as adults to the animal-becoming-human:
it is a response to a refusal to allow children to come into their het-
erologous inheritance by denying the fundamental dualism of the human
species.
Being drawn into Bataille’s world and becoming complicitous with his
thought involves adopting his ‘opposition to the idea of project’. Such a
position results in a profound ambivalence about the education of children
under conditions of late, homogenous modernity. A partial immersion in
this world might lead one to ask: What spaces are there for transgression,
for the dejecta, the ‘waste products of intellectual appropriation’? (Bataille,
1985, p. 96). What is the place of non-discursive modes of thought: the
mythical, analogical, affective? How can we ‘recognise the profound value
of these lost modes of thought’ (Bataille, 2006, p. 64)? And finally, is there a
way of regaining what he calls ‘the domain of the moment (the kingdom of
childhood)’ (Bataille, 2012b, p. 10) in opposition to modernity’s futurism?
However, it may be, as Bataille occasionally argues, that:
It is time to abandon the world of the civilized and its light. It is too late
to want to be reasonable and learned, which has led to a life without
attractions. Secretly or not, it is necessary to become other, or else
cease to be. (Bataille, 2018, p. 124)
There is a sense in which the iconic child who is found in Bataille’s work
can be seen in the Romantic tradition of nostalgia for what is lost to the hu-
man condition under late modernity. But there is an important difference:
as non-productive expenditure (sovereignty) is diminished, so also is taboo,
which is the defining character of the species. The pedagogical relationship
becomes shameful if we lose our sense of the fundamental bivalency of be-
ing human and that there are absolute dangers to both work and sovereignty
in our denial of what is useless, excessive and transgressive.
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NOTES
1. The strategic use of humanism in the political context of post-war Europe and its relation to the
emergent French existentialism is explored by Baring (2010).
2. Surrealists viewed humanism as a totalitarian ideological platform which takes its place be-
side both Stalinist communism and Fascism, anticipating a number of themes of anti-humanist
thought (Eburne, 2006).
3. I explore Surrealist thought in relation to understandings of childhood elsewhere (Jessop, 2018).
4. ‘dunkeln’ is rendered as ‘obscure’ in the Standard Edition I am using here but would normally
be translated as ‘dark’.
5. Freud continues: ‘Though they are unintelligible to us, to those who are dominated by them they
are taken as a matter of course’. In later writings, Freud speaks about the inherent reasonableness
of the prohibitions of ‘civilisation’ which are there to serve human interests, and which are
‘intended to make our communal life possible’ (albeit not recognised as such by those who
see them as arbitrary restrictions (Freud, 2001b, pp. 15, 41). In this discussion Freud no longer
employs the term ‘taboo’ which continues to be associated with man’s infancy which is still
visible in ‘primitive’ societies. It is originary rather than a living part of contemporary European
society (Freud, 2001c, p. 101).
6. Richardson warns that ‘it is no use approaching [Bataille’s] work with the aim of ‘understanding’
him in any conventional sense’ (1994, p. viii) and I follow his advice that Bataille is not ‘for
those who are merely interested in a vague way in this work, but for those who would seek out
its consequences’ (Richardson, 1998, p. ix).
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